Following the March referendum in Crimea, in which 96 percent of Crimeans, a majority of whom are ethnic Russians, voted to leave Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, President Vladimir Putin spoke to the Russian parliament and the international community. He began the speech waxing about the cultural and historical ties between Crimea and Russia, paying eulogy to the legendary giants of Russian imperialism and their shared Orthodox faith. He then went on to reprimand former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for relinquishing Crimea, an act that, according to Putin, was unconstitutional. He admonished the Bolsheviks for returning large chunks of land to Ukraine and bewailed the collapse of the Soviet Union altogether – an event he has relentlessly referred to as “the greatest geo-political disaster of the 20th-century.”

Towards the middle of the speech, Putin finally turned his ire on the West. To thunderous applause, Putin declared, “[The West and the United States] are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy.”

For many Russians, the speech was a reminder that their country is still a great power. For Putin, it was a defiant repudiation of the West. The Putin Doctrine believes Russian compatriots are part of a single Russian nation, regardless of national borders. Therefore, in the views of the Kremlin, Russia will make whatever moves it deems as necessary to ensure their protection, including for those Russian nationals in the former Soviet republics, like Ukraine. It is a highly assertive interpretation of Russia’s post-Cold War decline.

For Putin to realize this prerogative, his country needs leverage in the West. Today, Russia provides over 30 percent of Europe’s gas needs. It is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and has over a dozen major pipelines cutting across Europe.

Since coming to power, Putin has not been shy about using his country’s abundant natural gas and oil as a strategic weapon. Putin’s energy and foreign policies are conjoined at the hip. It is a strategy of energy blackmail, where critical energy supplies are used as a political force, and Russian pipelines are used, like strings on a marionette, to control its neighbors and force the opponent’s hand. They remain the major tools by which Putin seeks to reestablish Soviet-era hegemony. So far, Europe’s dependence on Russian gas has made it difficult to forcefully confront Putin about the conflict in Crimea.

In Eastern Europe especially, gas has been used for years to keep the region close to Moscow. One of the reasons why Russia opposes a European Union-friendly Ukraine is because it will threaten its gas and oil pipelines running across that country.

Pipelines are politically symbolic. Not only do they represent huge investments of billions of dollars, but they also economically bind countries together in a relationship that is unlike any other kind of commercial endeavor. Losing Ukraine would mean losing Russia’s most important sphere of influence and the doorway to the rest of Europe.

Putin may have successfully annexed Crimea, but he has done so at the cost of antagonizing many Ukrainians. The outcome is a short-term victory with a long-term setback. Without Ukrainian cooperation, Russia could see its critical energy trade with Europe hindered and its influence diminished.

Furthermore, Putin’s aggression has forced many in the EU, like Germany, to pursue greater energy independence. At its core, Putin’s strategy is predicated on the premise that Russian gas will remain an inelastic good in Europe.

In the long-run, as the West moves towards energy diversification and weans itself off Russian energy, Putin’s “Big Gas Stick” Policy will collapse like a house of cards. Putin is a shrewd opportunist but a predictable long-term strategist. By unilaterally taking Crimea, Putin has put his pipelines in conceivable trouble and put Russia’s long-term influence with the West in jeopardy.

Putin may profess that the Cold War is over and concluded, but his policies are nostalgic for Soviet power. Ultimately, he sees a dichotomized arena in which Russia and her tributes are pitted against the West. He sees a bipolar world in which Russia has slipped from its former dominant role. Under Putin, Russia has become a fallen hegemon hungry to reclaim its runaway territories by using military might in one hand and energy deprivation in the other.

However, Putin’s strategy is a defective one, unable to survive the stress of time and consumer expectations. In the lexis of Otto von Bismarck, Putin is like a man with “a large appetite but very poor teeth.” Putin has great ambitions for his country, but he and his policies lack the long-term resources and the right strategy to realize it.

– By Doo Lee

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